Pricing, allocation, and overbooking in dynamic service network competition when demand is uncertain

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mookherjee, Reetabrata; Friesz, Terry L.
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
• 刊物名称: PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1059-1478
• DOI: 10.3401/poms.1080.0042
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 455-474
• 关键词: revenue management; pricing and allocation; overbooking; dynamic games; Variational inequalities

摘要

We study the problem of combined pricing, resource allocation, and overbooking by service providers involved in dynamic noncooperative oligopolistic competition on a network that represents the relationships of the providers to one another and to their customers when service demand is uncertain. We propose, analyze, and compute solutions for a model that is more general than other models reported in the revenue management literature to date. In particular, previous models typically consider only three or four of five key revenue management features that we have purposely built into our model: (1) pricing, (2) resource allocation, (3) dynamic competition, (4) an explicit network, and (5) uncertain demand. Illustrative realizations of the abstract problem we study are those of airline revenue management and service provision by companies facing resource constraints. Under fairly general regularity conditions, we prove existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for dynamic oligopolistic service network competition described by our model. We also show, for an appropriate notion of regularity, that competition leads to the underpricing of network services, a finding numerically illustrated by an example of intermediate size. Our proposed algorithm can be implemented using well-known off-the-shelf commercial software.