Coordinating a supply chain system with retailers under both price and inventory competition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zhao, Xuan
• 署名单位: Wilfrid Laurier University
• 刊物名称: PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1059-1478
• DOI: 10.3401/poms.1080.0054
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 532-542
• 关键词: Pricing; inventory; COMPETITION; COORDINATION

摘要

We investigate a supply chain system with a common supplier selling to downstream retailers who are engaged in both price and inventory competition. We establish the existence and uniqueness of the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for the retailer game and study how a supplier can coordinate the system to achieve the best performance. Our main conclusions are as follows: First, a buyback contract can be used to coordinate retailers competing on both price and inventory in a sense that optimal retail prices and inventory levels arise as the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. With symmetric retailers, the system optimum arises as the unique symmetric equilibrium. Second, the particular type of competition experienced by retailers (price versus inventory competition) affects the characteristics of the contract. Specifically, strong price competition leads to a coordination mechanism with a positive buyback rate, where the supplier subsidizes retailers for leftover inventories; however, strong inventory competition leads to a negative buyback rate, where retailers are punished for overstocking. Using a linear expected demand function, we further explore the impact of system parameters on the coordination contract and the competitive equilibrium. We also find that the performance of the supplier's optimal contract is asymptotic to the system optimal coordination contract as competition becomes fierce.