Bank performance and executive compensation: A managerial discretion perspective

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Magnan, ML; StOnge, S
• 署名单位: Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(199708)18:7<573::AID-SMJ900>3.3.CO;2-B
• 发表日期: 1997
• 页码: 573-581
• 关键词: ceo compensation; MANAGERIAL DISCRETION; Commercial banking; firm performance

摘要

This study investigates how the relationship between bank performance and executive compensation is affected by the degree of an executive's managerial discretion. Managerial discretion is captured by two industry-specific attributes: a bank's strategic domain, and its regulatory environment. Executive compensation is found to be more related to bank performance in a context of high managerial discretion than in a contest of low managerial discretion. (C) 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.