The strategic value of CEO external directorate networks: Implications for CEO compensation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Geletkanycz, MA; Boyd, BK; Finkelstein, S
• 署名单位: Boston College; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Dartmouth College
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/smj.172
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 889-898
• 关键词: ceo compensation; executive networks; Social capital; strategic leadership

摘要

This study examines the relationship between CEO external directorate networks and CEO compensation. Drawing on previous research showing a link between executives' external networks, firm strategy, and performance, the study argues that executive external networks are strategically valuable to firms; thus, they should be reflected in executive compensation. The study further examines whether firm diversification, with its elevated demand for strategic resources, moderates the relationship between CEO external directorate networks and pay. Hypotheses are tested using a sample of 460 Fortune 1000 firms. Analyses reveal that the rewards to CEO external directorate networks are contingent upon the firm's level of diversification. Implications for future research and practice are discussed. Copyright (C) 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.