Organization governance form in franchising: Efficient contracting or organizational momentum?

• 成果类型: Editorial Material
• 署名作者: Mitsuhashi, Hitoshi; Shane, Scott; Sine, Wesley D.
• 署名单位: Cornell University; Keio University; University System of Ohio; Case Western Reserve University
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/smj.702
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 1127-1136
• 关键词: franchising; governance form; efficient contracting; organizational momentum

摘要

We examine firms' choice of organizational governance form. Using longitudinal data on a sample of business format franchisors operating in North America, we shou; that the cross-sectional evidence commonly used to demonstrate support for efficient contracting explanations for organizational governance form is not robust to the year of investigation, firm effects, or selection effects. We theorize that this outcome may result from dynamic processes through which a firm's organizational governance form evolves. We develop and test two hypotheses for the effects of organizational momentum on organizational governance form, and find that organizational monentum is a robust predictor. Our results suggest that researchers consider the dynamics of momentum hi explaining the form of firm governance. Copyright (C) 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.