THE EFFECT OF CEO PAY DEVIATIONS ON CEO WITHDRAWAL, FIRM SIZE, AND FIRM PROFITS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fong, Eric A.; Misangyi, Vilmos F.; Tosi, Henry L., Jr.
• 署名单位: University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Huntsville; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; State University System of Florida; University of Florida; Bocconi University
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/smj.827
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 629-651
• 关键词: ceo compensation; ceo turnover; CEO power; equity; labor markets; OVERPAYMENT

摘要

We build upon previous work on the effects of deviations in CEO pay from labor markets to assess how overcompensation or undercompensation affects subsequent voluntary CEO withdrawal, firm size, and firm profitability, taking into account the moderating effect of firm ownership structure. We find that CEO underpayment is related to changes in firm size and CEO withdrawal, and that the relationship between CEO underpayment and CEO withdrawal is stronger in owner-controlled firms. We also show that when CEOs are overpaid, there is higher firm profitability; a relationship that is weaker among manager-controlled firms. We then discuss the implications that these findings have for Mitre research. Copyright (C) 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.