SHADOW OF THE CONTRACT: HOW CONTRACT STRUCTURE SHAPES INTERFIRM DISPUTE RESOLUTION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lumineau, Fabrice; Malhotra, Deepak
• 署名单位: University of Technology Sydney; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/smj.890
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 532-555
• 关键词: contractual governance; disputes; framing; interest-based negotiation and rights-based negotiation; control and coordination; POWER

摘要

This paper investigates how contract structure influences interfirm dispute resolution processes and outcomes by examining a unique dataset consisting of over 150,000 pages of documents relating to 102 business disputes. We find that the level of contract detail affects the type of dispute resolution approach that is adopted when conflict arises, and that different approaches are associated with different costs for resolving the dispute. We also find that the effect of contract choice on dispute resolution approach is moderated by the degree of coordination required in the relationship, and that the effect of dispute approach on costs is moderated by the degree of power asymmetry between the parties. Thus, even after controlling for various attributes of the exchange relationship and the dispute, the choice of contracting structure has important strategic implications. Copyright (c) 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.