WHEN DO STRATEGIC ALLIANCES INHIBIT INNOVATION BY FIRMS? EVIDENCE FROM PATENT POOLS IN THE GLOBAL OPTICAL DISC INDUSTRY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Joshi, Amol M.; Nerkar, Atul
• 署名单位: University of Hawaii System; University of Hawaii Manoa; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/smj.929
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 1139-1160
• 关键词: Patent pools; alliances; INNOVATION; performance; Licensing

摘要

Research and development (R&D) consortia are specialized strategic alliances that shape the direction and scope of firm innovation activities. Little research exists on the performance consequences of participating in R&D consortia. We study the effect of patent pools, a unique form of R&D consortia, on firm performance in innovation. While prior research on alliances generally implies that patent pools enhance firm innovation, our study finds the opposite. Analyzing data on systemic innovation in the global optical disc industry, we find that patent pool formation substantially and significantly decreases both the quantity and quality of patents subsequently generated by licensors and licensees relative to the patenting activity of nonparticipants. Our empirical findings suggest that patent pools actually inhibit, rather than enhance, systemic innovation by participating firms. Copyright (C) 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.