MNES AND CORRUPTION: THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND SUBSIDIARY STRATEGY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Spencer, Jennifer; Gomez, Carolina
• 署名单位: George Washington University; State University System of Florida; Florida International University; Elon University
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/smj.874
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 280-300
• 关键词: corruption; multinational enterprises; BRIBERY; INSTITUTIONAL THEORY; alliances; Developing countries

摘要

We argue that the pressure MNE subsidiaries face to engage in corrupt practices in their host country varies positively with the institutionalization of corrupt practices in both host and home country environments. We further argue that the relationship between an MNE's home country environment and the pressure it faces in the host country is moderated by its localization strategy. Results suggest a positive relationship between the host country corruption environment and the pressure subsidiaries face to engage in bribery locally. Mixed results emerged concerning MNEs from home countries participating in the OECD Convention for Combating Bribery. Results concerning the impact of the home country corruption environment are best viewed in light of significant moderating effects. When MNEs did not have local partners, firms from less corrupt home countries reported less pressure to engage in corrupt practices locally; however, the presence of local partners eliminated this relationship. Results will help managers understand the pressures their firm is likely to face when operating in corrupt host country environments, and also offer guidance concerning how the firm might reduce its exposure to those local institutional pressures. Copyright (C) 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.