Strategic Capacity Planning Problems in Revenue-Sharing Joint Ventures

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Levi, Retsef; Perakis, Georgia; Shi, Cong; Sun, Wei
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; International Business Machines (IBM); IBM USA
• 刊物名称: PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1059-1478
• DOI: 10.1111/poms.13128
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 664-687
• 关键词: Capacity planning; Joint venture; Revenue sharing; game theory; EFFICIENCY; COORDINATION

摘要

We study strategic capacity investment problems in joint ventures (JVs) with fixed-rate revenue-sharing contracts. We adopt a game-theoretical approach to study two types of JVs depending on how individual resources determine the effective capacity of a JV. With complementary resources, the effective capacity of a JV is constrained by the most scarce resource. We show that multiple Nash equilibria could exist. Nevertheless, there exists a unique Strong Nash equilibrium. We show that there is an efficient and fair fixed-rate revenue-sharing contract which induces the system optimal outcome in the Strong Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, with substitutable a resource, the effective capacity of a JV is measured by aggregating individual contributions. We show that there does not exist a fixed-rate revenue-sharing contract that induces the system optimum. We quantify that the efficiency of a JV which decreases with the number of participants, the cost asymmetry and the cost margin of the JV. We propose provably-good fixed-rate revenue-sharing contracts with performance guarantees. We also propose a simple modified contract to achieve the channel coordination. Finally, we fit our model with historical data to shed some insights on two JV examples in the motion picture industry.