REWARDING VALUE-CREATING IDEAS IN ORGANIZATIONS: THE POWER OF LOW-POWERED INCENTIVES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Baumann, Oliver; Stieglitz, Nils
• 署名单位: University of Southern Denmark; Frankfurt School Finance & Management
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/smj.2093
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 358-375
• 关键词: organizational search; REWARD SYSTEMS; VALUE CREATION; employee innovation; STRATEGY PROCESS

摘要

Ideas from employees are a major source of value creation in firms, yet the merits of rewards for incentivizing the generation of ideas are highly contested. Using a computational model, we show that firms can improve performance by offering low-powered rewards for the selection and implementation of employee ideas. Low-powered incentives provide a sufficient stream of good ideas, but few exceptional ones. Higher-powered incentives, in contrast, do not systematically translate into exceptional ideas either, but generate an excessive number of good ideas. Performance-based rewards thus appear to be a blunt tool to harness the long tail of innovation. We develop propositions to guide empirical research and discuss their implications for strategy and organizational design. Copyright (c) 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.