Should an Incumbent Store Deter Entry of a Socially Responsible Retailer?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Korpeoglu, C. Gizem; Korpeoglu, Ersin; Tang, Christopher S.; Yu, Jiayi Joey
• 署名单位: Eindhoven University of Technology; University of London; University College London; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Fudan University
• 刊物名称: PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1059-1478
• DOI: 10.1177/10591478231224935
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 282-302
• 关键词: competition; incumbent; socially responsible operations

摘要

Should an incumbent for-profit retailer deter a socially responsible store from entering the market? As a differentiation strategy to avoid direct price competition with well-established retailers, some socially responsible stores (or brands) enter the market with a pre-commitment to donate a certain proportion of their (A) profits or (B) revenues to charities. Because these charitable donations generate a warm-glow effect for consumers, these socially responsible stores can use pre-committed donations to gain market access. In this paper, we present a game-theoretic model in which a socially responsible retailer enters the market to compete with an incumbent for-profit retailer. We determine and compare the incumbent retailer's deterrence strategies (i.e., deter or tolerate) across different types of socially responsible stores. Our equilibrium analysis generates the following insights. First, the incumbent retailer's deterrence strategy depends on its cost advantage over the socially responsible store, and hinges upon the socially responsible store's entry cost, pre-commitment level, and its warm-glow effect. Second, even if the incumbent retailer can profitably deter the socially responsible retailer's entry, the incumbent retailer can actually be better off by tolerating instead of deterring its entry when the socially responsible store's entry cost is low and the incumbent store's cost advantage is not significant. Third, relatively speaking, a type (B) store that donates a portion of its revenue is more vulnerable unless it can generate a much higher warm-glow effect. We extend our analysis numerically to examine the case when the pre-committed proportion is endogenously determined and obtain similar structural results.