Persuading Skeptics and Fans in the Presence of Additional Information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Boyaci, Tamer; Chakraborty, Soudipta; Gurkan, Huseyin
• 署名单位: European School of Management & Technology; University of Kansas
• 刊物名称: PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1059-1478
• DOI: 10.1177/10591478241239931
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 1142-1154
• 关键词: Information design; Bayesian persuasion; Costly information acquisition; pilot tests; product reviews

摘要

We consider the information design problem of a demand-maximizing firm launching a product of unknown quality to a market consisting of customers who have heterogeneous prior beliefs about quality. The firm publicly discloses information about quality to all customers. These customers can subsequently opt to acquire additional information about the product at a cost from sources beyond the firm's control. Our study is motivated by the common practice of firms conducting public pilot tests or soliciting reviews from opinion leaders before launching a new product to inform potential customers about its quality. To analyze this problem, we construct a game-theoretic model of Bayesian persuasion between the firm and its customers. We characterize the firm's optimal information policy and show that it can range from fully disclosing quality to exaggerating or downplaying quality to not disclosing quality at all depending on market characteristics. We delineate the impact of market heterogeneity and access to additional information on the optimal information disclosure policy of the firm. Our analysis provides managerial guidance for firms in designing information provision strategies and operationalizing them for different market characteristics.