Effects of Scarcity-Induced Demand on Crowdfunding Market

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Zhou, Zhijin; Liu, Ye; Ma, Chaoliang; Tan, Yong
• 署名单位: University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
• 刊物名称: PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1059-1478
• DOI: 10.1177/10591478231224923
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: Crowdfunding; scarcity strategy; behavioral mechanism; hierarchical Bayesian

摘要

Fundraisers on reward-based crowdfunding platforms have increasingly sought to base their promotional strategy on the principle of scarcity. Although previous studies find that using a limited-edition inventory contributes to the success of campaigns, it remains unknown how fundraisers should leverage a scarcity strategy in the upfront design of reward options. Using a unique dynamic panel dataset from a leading reward-based crowdfunding platform, we develop a hierarchical Bayesian model to capture the dynamic arrival process of backers at the reward option level. We find that backers are driven by excess demand rather than limited supply. Putting quantity restrictions on a reward option can discourage demand if it fails to accumulate an adequate number of backers first. In addition, the scarcity strategy is more effective in high-priced reward options than in low-priced reward options. This study offers practical implications for the implementation of a scarcity strategy for both platform managers and fundraisers.