Integration Through Incentives Within Differentiated Organizations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kretschmer, Tobias; Puranam, Phanish
• 署名单位: University of Munich; University of London; London Business School
• 刊物名称: ORGANIZATION SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1047-7039
• DOI: 10.1287/orsc.1070.0352
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 860-875
• 关键词: coordination; incentives; interdivisional relationships; merger integration

摘要

Drawing on the concepts of organizational differentiation and integration, we present a formal analysis of the manner in which these two consequences of specialization shape the effectiveness of collaborative incentives in complex organizations. We show that ignoring the coordination challenges created by differentiation does not merely impede the achievement of gains from integration through incentives, but can lower organizational performance below the levels achieved when such gains are simply ignored. Thus, treating interunit collaboration purely as a problem of motivating cooperation can be counterproductive. We describe implications in the context of interdivisional relationships and postmerger integration.