Understanding the Role of Worker Interdependence in Team Selection

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Millhiser, William P.; Coen, Corinne A.; Solow, Daniel
• 署名单位: City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); University System of Ohio; Case Western Reserve University; University System of Ohio; Case Western Reserve University
• 刊物名称: ORGANIZATION SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1047-7039
• DOI: 10.1287/orsc.1100.0549
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 772-787
• 关键词: design; Team design; group performance; group processes; computational simulation; interdependence; organizational complexity

摘要

In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of policies for assigning interdependent workers to teams. Using a computational simulation, we contrast distributing workers equitably across teams based on prior individual performance with policies that distribute workers based on how well people work together. First, we test a policy that clusters workers into teams by finding natural breakpoints among them where their mutual support is weak. Then we test two other policies that both protect the strongest interdependent core of high performers but differ in that one policy separates workers who give little support to interdependent partners and the other separates workers who receive little support from their partners. All three policies outperform the equitable-distribution approach in some circumstances. We make recommendations to managers for harnessing interdependence when forming teams, whether the managers are familiar or unfamiliar with how well their people work together.