Status-Amplified Deterrence: Paul Manafort's Prosecution Under the Foreign Agents Registration Act

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Kim, Jin Hyung; Hurst, Reuben; Siegel, Jordan
• 署名单位: George Washington University; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: ORGANIZATION SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1047-7039
• DOI: 10.1287/orsc.2024.18754
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: organizational misconduct; white-collar crime; lobbying; business and society; business and politics

摘要

Social control agents often struggle to deter organizational deviance. We propose a theory of status-amplified deterrence wherein enforcement's deterrent effects are amplified when carried out against high-status organizational actors. First, this enforcement is interpreted as willingness and ability for far-reaching enforcement. Next, amplified deterrence occurs as these episodes become widely known through (1) extensive media coverage and (2) the marketing efforts of third-party compliance advisors. We examine this theory in the context of the U.S. Department of Justice's enforcement against Paul Manafort for violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). Using a difference-in-differences design, we demonstrate that enforcement against Manafort caused a widespread, sustained, and economically significant reduction in FARA noncompliance. We show supplementary evidence consistent with the idea that deterrence was amplified in significant part by media attention and by law firms referencing the episode while successfully marketing FARA advisory services. We contribute to literature illuminating how organizations, in conjunction with third-party compliance advisors, adjust deviant activities in response to shifting regulatory environments.