Organizational Selection of Innovation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Boettcher, Luca; Klingebiel, Ronald
• 署名单位: Frankfurt School Finance & Management; State University System of Florida; University of Florida; Frankfurt School Finance & Management
• 刊物名称: ORGANIZATION SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1047-7039
• DOI: 10.1287/orsc.2023.17357
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: organizational choice; decision aggregation; resource allocation; innovation portfolios

摘要

Budgetary constraints force organizations to pursue only a subset of possible innovation projects. Identifying which subset is most promising is an error-prone exercise, and involving multiple decision makers may be prudent. This raises the question of how to most effectively aggregate their collective nous. Our model of organizational portfolio selection provides some first answers. We show that portfolio performance can vary widely. Delegating evaluation makes sense when organizations employ the relevant experts and can assign projects to them. In most other settings, aggregating the impressions of multiple agents leads to better performance than delegation. In particular, letting agents rank projects often outperforms alternative aggregation rules-including averaging agents' project scores and counting their approval votes-especially when organizations have tight budgets and can select only a few project alternatives out of many.