Difference in Deference: When Competitors Do Not Give in Despite Having Lost

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Durand, Rodolphe; Piezunka, Henning; Reineke, Philipp
• 署名单位: Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; University of Pennsylvania; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: ORGANIZATION SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1047-7039
• DOI: 10.1287/orsc.2023.17474
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: deference; status; COMPETITION; Rivalry; Contest

摘要

When a contest is decided, the inferior competitor is supposed to defer to the superior opponent. Yet, sometimes the losing actors refuse to give in. We theorize why and when losing actors do not defer-even when they are supposed to. We hypothesize that when the losing actors categorize their relationship with an opponent as rivalrous beyond the current contest and may obtain some contest-specific gains independent of the focal encounter, they will not defer as much as expected. Unique data from Formula One racing prove strong support. Our findings contribute to research on deference as well as on competition and rivalry. Our study also has broader implications as it helps explain when people do not respect social norms while competing-be it for rewards, for promotions, or in elections.