Technological uncertainty, buyer preferences and supplier assurances: An examination of Pacific Rim purchasing arrangements
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Celly, KS; Spekman, RE; Kamauff, JW
署名单位：
University of California System; University of California Irvine; California State University System; California State University Long Beach; University of Virginia
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2506
DOI：
10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8490071
发表日期：
1999
页码：
297-316
关键词：
摘要：
We use the metaphor of the mutual assurance game to develop the notion that overseas suppliers may proactively manage uncertainty by making customized investments tp serve their buyers. Using this game-theoretic conceptualization as a complement to the transactions cost analysis notion of credible commitments, we argue that such investments serve as assurances of commitment to the international buyer. The hypotheses are tested using data collected in a survey of U.S. purchasing managers regarding their relationships with their Pacific Rim suppliers. Consistent with our hypotheses, our primary results indicate that suppliers' relationship-specific investments are greater when technological uncertainty is high and buyers value supplier responsiveness. Further, our results suggest that relationship stability and buyer information sharing are greater when supplier relationship-specific investments are greater. These results provide some support for our argument that in the face of technological uncertainty, overseas suppliers may unilaterally commit to their buyers in attempts to obtain reciprocal benefits that help them manage external uncertainty.