Too Much Information: The Perils of Nondiagnostic Information in Negotiations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wiltermuth, Scott S.; Neale, Margaret A.
• 署名单位: University of Southern California; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0021-9010
• DOI: 10.1037/a0021871
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 192-201
• 关键词: negotiations; nondiagnostic information; dilution-effect; negotiator; decision making

摘要

Two studies showed that possessing information about a negotiation counterpart that is irrelevant to the negotiation task can impair negotiators' effectiveness because such knowledge impedes effective information exchange. In Study 1, negotiators who possessed diagnostic and nondiagnostic forms of information were each less likely to exchange information about their preferences within the negotiation. However, only those negotiators who possessed nondiagnostic information achieved inferior negotiation outcomes as a result. In Study 2, negotiators possessing nondiagnostic information about their counterparts in electronically mediated negotiations were more likely to terminate the search for mutually beneficial outcomes prematurely and declare impasses. They were also less able to use diagnostic forms of information to make mutually beneficial trade-offs. As a result, negotiators in these dyads achieved inferior outcomes.