Pyramiding vs leverage in corporate groups: International evidence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Faccio, Mara; Lang, Larry H. P.; Young, Leslie
• 署名单位: Purdue University System; Purdue University; Chinese University of Hong Kong
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2506
• DOI: 10.1057/jibs.2009.33
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 88-104
• 关键词: finance; corporate governance; capital structure

摘要

Among firms listed in Western Europe and East Asia, when creditor protection is strong, the controlling shareholder trades off retaining control in bad states through pyramiding against retaining the upside in good states via leverage. This result might arise because the controlling shareholder uses both leverage and pyramiding to expand control of resources, but in different circumstances since they have different outcomes under downside shocks. When creditor protection is weak, the controlling shareholder no longer prefers pyramiding in bad states, because creditors will not be able to seize the firm in bad states. Therefore pyramiding and leverage are used together. Journal of International Business Studies (2010) 41, 88-104. doi:10.1057/jibs.2009.33