High-level politically connected firms, corruption, and analyst forecast accuracy around the world

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Charles J. P.; Ding, Yuan; Kim, Chansog (Francis)
• 署名单位: China Europe International Business School; City University of Hong Kong
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2506
• DOI: 10.1057/jibs.2010.27
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 1505-1524
• 关键词: political relationships; CORRUPTION; primary data source; Accounting

摘要

The international business (IB) literature has widely recognized political forces as major factors that complicate the strategic decisions of multinational enterprises (MNEs) Analyses by financial intermediaries can help to reduce the risk of information asymmetry caused by such factors Using firm-level data from 17 jurisdictions between 1997 and 2001, this study investigates the association between a firm's high level political connections and earnings forecasts made by financial analysts, an important group of financial intermediaries We find that, after controlling for other determinants of forecast accuracy, analysts experience greater difficulty in predicting the earnings of firms with political connections than those of firms with no such connections However, in jurisdictions in which corruption level is relatively high, earnings forecast accuracy is influenced more by a firm's political connections Our findings contribute to the IB literature by demonstrating that political connections exacerbate the information asymmetry between investors and managers, and also that anti corruption measures can curb the adverse effect of political connections on the corporate information environment These findings bear the practical implication that MNEs must consider political issues when making resource allocation decisions Journal of International Business Studies (2010) 41, 1505-1524 doi 10 1057/jibs 2010 27