Lay Theories of Effortful Honesty: Does the Honesty-Effort Association Justify Making a Dishonest Decision?

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Lee, Julia J.; Ong, Madeline; Parmar, Bidhan; Amit, Elinor
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; University of Virginia; Brown University; Tel Aviv University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0021-9010
• DOI: 10.1037/apl0000364
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 659-677
• 关键词: morality; Effort; behavioral ethics; situational strength; justifications

摘要

Are our moral decisions and actions influenced by our beliefs about how much effort it takes to do the right thing? We hypothesized that the belief that honesty is effortful predicts subsequent dishonest behavior because it facilitates one's ability to justify such actions. In Study 1 (N = 210), we developed an implicit measure of people's beliefs about whether honesty is effortful, and we found that this lay theory predicts dishonesty. In Study 2 (N = 339), we experimentally manipulated individuals' lay theories about honesty and effort and found that an individual's lay theory that honesty is effortful increased subsequent dishonesty. In Study 3, we manipulated (Study 3a; N = 294) and measured (Study 3b; N = 153) lay theories, and then manipulated the strength of situational force that encourages dishonesty, and found that an individual's lay theory influences subsequent dishonesty only in a weak situation, where individuals have more agency to interpret the situation. This research provides novel insights into how our lay theories linking honesty and effort can help us rationalize our dishonesty, independent of whether a particular moral decision requires effort or not.