Head Above the Parapet: How Minority Subordinates Influence Group Outcomes and the Consequences They Face for Doing So

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Oc, Burak; Bashshur, Michael R.; Moore, Celia
• 署名单位: University of Western Australia; Singapore Management University; Bocconi University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0021-9010
• DOI: 10.1037/apl0000376
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 929-945
• 关键词: MINORITY INFLUENCE; upward feedback; powerholders; allocation behavior

摘要

Research on power often treats the recipients of powerholders' decisions (i.e., subordinates) as an undifferentiated group, overlooking how their responses to powerholders' decisions might vary and how those responses might affect powerholders' later decisions. In this article, we examine the role of lone dissenting subordinates (individuals whose feedback differs from that expressed by other group members) in shaping powerholders' allocation decisions, and explore the consequences those subordinates face for their dissent. In 3 experimental studies, we show that even as a lone voice, the feedback of a dissenting subordinate influences powerholders' decisions. Powerholders make more self-interested allocations when a lone subordinate provides consistently positive feedback, even when others provide mostly negative feedback. However, powerholders regulate their allocations when a lone subordinate provides candid feedback that points out the self-interested nature of their allocations, even when others provide consistently positive feedback. We further show that lone dissenting subordinates' influence is stronger when they share a salient group membership with the powerholder (e.g., their school or political affiliation). Finally, we find that powerholders reward lone subordinates who provide them with positive feedback, but only punish lone candid subordinates if they do not share a salient group membership with them. Overall, our results suggest that subordinates who risk putting their head above the parapet can improve outcomes for their group members, and can avoid being punished for doing so, as long as they share a salient group membership with the powerholder.