Toward understanding joint venture performance and survival: A bargaining and influence approach to transaction cost theory

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pearce, RJ
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0363-7425
• DOI: 10.2307/259229
• 发表日期: 1997
• 页码: 203-225
• 关键词: STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING; ORGANIZATIONAL POLITICS; INFLUENCE TACTICS; INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS; GROUP COHESIVENESS; CONSEQUENCES; management; interdependence; determinants; environment

摘要

The author posits that the joint venture ((JV) form of governance imposes a greater burden of bargaining and political influence costs than is present in ct hierarchy. The iv's incremental costs derive from shared sovereignty and incomplete contracting. The magnitude of those costs is related to parental differences, factionalism, and task interdependence in the top management team (TMT), and dynamism in the task environment. The costs are argued to undermine the quality of TMT decision making, thereby negatively affecting organizational adaptation, performance, and survival.