Competition, cooperation, and the search for economic rents: A syncretic model

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Lado, AA; Boyd, NG; Hanlon, SC
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; University of Akron; University of North Texas System; University of North Texas Denton
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0363-7425
• DOI: 10.2307/259226
• 发表日期: 1997
• 页码: 110-141
• 关键词: ORGANIZATIONAL LIFE-CYCLES; COLLECTIVE STRATEGY; QUALITY MANAGEMENT; CORPORATE-STRATEGY; Stakeholder theory; TOP MANAGEMENT; advantage; resource; competence; PARADOX

摘要

In this article, the notion of syncretic rent-seeking behavior is proposed to explain how firms generate economic rents through competition and cooperation. Previously, competition and cooperation have been viewed largely as opposite ends of a single continuum. By conceptualizing competition and cooperation as distinct but interrelated dimensions, we develop a:four-cell typology of rent-seeking strategic behaviors. Propositions linking syncretic rent-seeking behavior, organizational competencies, and business performance are offered to guide future theory development and research efforts.