Group pay-for-performance plans: The role of spontaneous goal setting

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Hollensbe, EC; Guthrie, JP
• 署名单位: University of Kansas
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0363-7425
• DOI: 10.2307/259211
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 864-872
• 关键词: self-efficacy; EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION; monetary incentives; GAINSHARING PLAN; task-performance; COMMITMENT; interdependence; PRODUCTIVITY; CONSEQUENCES; preference

摘要

Despite the increasing popularity of group pay-for-performance plans, relatively little theory exists regarding the dynamics of these plans. We integrate goal setting, pay plan characteristics, and group factors to explain and predict the effectiveness of what we call open-goal group pay plans. We introduce spontaneous goal setting as a process explanation and propose antecedents that affect a group's propensity to set goals, the goal level chosen, and goal commitment. Finally, we discuss implications of our propositions for future research.