Privatization in emerging economies: An agency theory perspective

• 成果类型: Review
• 署名作者: Dharwadkar, R; George, G; Brandes, P
• 署名单位: Syracuse University
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0363-7425
• DOI: 10.2307/259316
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 650-669
• 关键词: free cash flow; Ownership structure; corporate governance; ceo compensation; DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGY; executive-compensation; managerial incentives; empirical-analysis; control mechanisms; capital structure

摘要

The ineffectiveness of several privatized firms within emerging economies underscores the importance of agency theory issues and their impact on the privatization performance relationship. We argue that weak governance and limited protection of minority shareholders intensify traditional principal-agent problems (perquisite consumption and entrenchment) and create unique agency problems (expropriation). We suggest that postprivatization performance earn be enhanced by using appropriate ownership, management, and corporate structures that mitigate agency problems in the context of weak governance, and we highlight avenues for research.