Reports of solving the conflicts of interest in auditing are highly exaggerated
成果类型:
Editorial Material
署名作者:
Bazerman, MH; Moore, DA; Tetlock, PE; Tanlu, L
署名单位:
Harvard University; Carnegie Mellon University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
刊物名称:
ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN:
0363-7425
发表日期:
2006
页码:
43-49
关键词:
BIAS BLIND SPOT
self
摘要:
Nelson argues that we should trust the auditing profession and collect more data before taking action to reform the auditing system. We argue that the risk of doing nothing is greater than the risk associated with reform, and that the arguments Nelson makes have been exploited by the auditing industry to defend a system that destroys the independence of audits for the financial benefit of the auditors themselves.