SELECTIVITY IN ORGANIZATIONAL RULE VIOLATIONS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lehman, David W.; Ramanujam, Rangaraj
• 署名单位: National University of Singapore; Vanderbilt University
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0363-7425
• DOI: 10.5465/AMR.2009.44882933
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 643-657
• 关键词: Risk preferences; prospect-theory; CORRUPTION; sociology; performance; adaptation; DYNAMICS; ANOMIE; MODEL; view

摘要

Organizational rule violations are more likely when performance falls below aspiration levels. We propose that such violations are systematically selective and that this selectivity emerges during the problemistic search for solutions to the performance shortfall. During this search, contextual conditions (structural secrecy and coupling between violations and outcomes) and characteristics of rules (enforceability, procedural emphasis, and connectedness) direct attention and shape risk perceptions. Consequently, some rules are more likely to be violated than others.