BOTH MARKET AND HIERARCHY: AN INCENTIVE-SYSTEM THEORY OF HYBRID GOVERNANCE FORMS
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Makadok, Richard; Coff, Russell
署名单位：
Emory University
刊物名称：
ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN：
0363-7425
DOI：
10.5465/AMR.2009.36982628
发表日期：
2009
页码：
297-319
关键词：
SELECTIVE INTERVENTION
ECONOMIC-ORGANIZATION
Information costs
LEVEL MODEL
KNOWLEDGE
firm
determinants
performance
modularity
INNOVATION
摘要：
We create a taxonomy of hybrid governance forms and develop a formal theory that predicts when a given hybrid form will be efficient. Our model is unique in that we consider cross-task synergies in a multitask principal-agent model, where hybrid forms result as principals try to motivate cooperation among agents indirectly through incentives, ownership, and formal authority. We conclude with a discussion of other mechanisms that might also help us understand and predict hybrid governance forms.
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