THE STRUCTURE OF ORGANIZATIONAL INCENTIVES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: LAMBERT, RA; LARCKER, DF; WEIGELT, K
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-8392
• DOI: 10.2307/2393375
• 发表日期: 1993
• 页码: 438-461
• 关键词: relative performance evaluation; Managerial compensation; executive-compensation; tournaments; pay; PERSPECTIVES; corporation; hypotheses; CONTRACTS; earnings

摘要

To improve understanding and design of organizational incentives, we used confidential compensation data obtained for four distinct organizational levels (ranging from plant manager to corporate chief executive officer) to evaluate the ability of tournament, managerial power, and agency theories to explain these observed compensation data. Our results suggest that organizational incentives are most appropriately characterized by a combination of these models, rather than being completely described by a single theoretical description.