The New Invisible Hand: How Common Owners Use the Media as a Strategic Tool

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: DesJardine, Mark R.; Shi, Wei; Cheng, Xin
• 署名单位: Dartmouth College; University of Miami; Renmin University of China; Renmin University of China
• 刊物名称: ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-8392
• DOI: 10.1177/00018392231192863
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 956-1007
• 关键词: institutional investors; corporate governance; financial fraud; Political bias; MARKET; COMPETITION; CONSEQUENCES; IMPACT; FIRMS; JOURNALISTS

摘要

While research has uncovered an array of visible competitive dynamics, a strategic world of competition lies beneath the surface that should also be theorized and empirically traced. We investigate the strategic consequences of media-rival common ownership, in which investors own a media company and a non-media focal firm's rivals. We posit that focal firms receive worse coverage from media outlets when institutional investors hold substantial ownership in both a media company and the focal firm's rivals because the investors' common holdings provide them with incentives and power to enhance the competitiveness of their portfolio firms by tainting the focal firm's media coverage. We account for three moderators to show that this effect amplifies when investors have stronger incentives and power to influence the media and when media executives have incentives to cater to the interests of their investors. Using a novel dataset on common ownership of rival firms and media companies, we find support for our theory. Our study reveals a new invisible hand underlying competitive markets and offers a new view of the media as a strategic tool.