DESIGNING ONLINE PLATFORMS FOR CUSTOMIZED GOODS AND SERVICES: A MARKET FRICTIONS-BASED PERSPECTIVE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chu, Leon Yang; Wu, Brian
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0363-7425
• DOI: 10.5465/amr.2020.0247
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 78-99
• 关键词: STRATEGIC FACTOR MARKETS; INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION; PROPERTY-RIGHTS; VALUE CREATION; firm; reputation; ECONOMICS; governance; RESOURCES; KNOWLEDGE

摘要

Through digitalization, online platforms facilitate suppliers to meet market demand with customized offerings, but this business model's value-creation potential is often hampered by market frictions. Consequently, suppliers may avoid exerting effort and so customers may be unwilling to pay a premium. This article develops an analytical model to address market frictions. We identify circumstances where the classic reputation mechanism is insufficient and then propose a new strategy whereby the platform accepts only a subset of suppliers. We demonstrate that this supplier-restriction strategy can sup-port a welfare-enhancing equilibrium and accelerate evolution even if all the suppliers are homogeneous and the customers can costlessly transact with suppliers outside the platform. At equilibrium, suppliers on the platform enjoy a higher market share than those outside and are motivated to exert effort; customers prefer to pay suppliers on the platform a premium and seek outside suppliers only if the former are unavailable. We evaluate platform profitability and social welfare, compare different payment struc-tures, and extend the model to accommodate issues regarding verifiability, imperfect sig-nals, and matching costs. Our work enriches the market frictions-based perspective by showing how it can guide platform design in governing economic exchanges.