THE SOCIAL CONTRACT IN MINIATURE: HOW VIRTUAL BARGAINING SUPPORTS TEAM PRODUCTION
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Zeitoun, Hossam; Melkonyan, Tigran; Chater, Nick
署名单位：
University of Warwick; University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa
刊物名称：
ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN：
0363-7425
DOI：
10.5465/amr.2020.0229
发表日期：
2023
页码：
432-462
关键词：
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACT
Organizational economics
RELATIONAL CONTRACTS
PRISONERS-DILEMMA
INTEGRATIVE MODEL
SHARED KNOWLEDGE
PROPERTY-RIGHTS
game-theory
governance
firm
摘要：
The ability of teams to self-organize and engage in spontaneous collaboration is crucial to 21st-century organizations. The large extent of nonroutine activities in such organiza-tions hampers the effectiveness of traditional management instruments, such as monitor-ing effort and performance levels and exercising fiat-resulting in increasingly important self-organized collaboration. To explain how such collaboration is possible, we suggest a refinement of the psychological assumptions underpinning influential theories of the firm-specifically, concerning how people reason. We juxtapose Nash reasoning (the mode of reasoning underpinning organizational economic theories of the firm) with virtual bargaining (a more collaborative mode of reasoning drawing on recent research in cognitive science). Virtual bargaining enables individuals to establish, maintain, and abide by tacit social contracts of their team and organization-the (often-tacit) norms, rules, roles, and responsibilities governing how employees should behave (irrespective of their personal objectives). Thus, virtual bargaining helps individuals mitigate challenges of team production, such as shirking and hold-up, in a self-organizing and self-enforcing way. We analyze the conditions under which virtual bargaining leads individuals to coordinate on enhanced effort levels in organizationally relevant settings. We outline ave-nues for empirically testing virtual bargaining in organizations and discuss conceptual implications.
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