EFFECT OF RELATIVE DECISION MONITORING ON CHIEF EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: KERR, JL; KREN, L
• 署名单位: University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Milwaukee
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/256378
• 发表日期: 1992
• 页码: 370-397
• 关键词: AGENCY-THEORY; corporate performance; empirical-analysis; moral hazard; diversification; incentives; firm; pay; DIRECTORS; OWNERSHIP

摘要

This study investigated the effects of relative decision monitoring, whereby decisions are compared to those of competitors, on chief executive officer [CEO] compensation. We tested for both cash compensation [salary plus bonus] and cash-plus-stock-option compensation. The study's premise was that, to the extent boards of directors consider behavioral information in the CEO evaluation process, performance should have a stronger influence on pay when CEO decisions differ from typical industry decisions. Thus, we compared critical strategic decisions of CEOs with the decisions of same-industry competitors. Results indicate that unique decision making significantly moderates the relationship between performance and compensation under some, but not all, conditions.