CEO DUALITY AS A DOUBLE-EDGED-SWORD - HOW BOARDS OF DIRECTORS BALANCE ENTRENCHMENT AVOIDANCE AND UNITY OF COMMAND

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: FINKELSTEIN, S; DAVENI, RA
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/256667
• 发表日期: 1994
• 页码: 1079-1108
• 关键词: ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE; DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGY; executive-compensation; construct-validity; corporate-control; Agency theory; management; governance; OWNERSHIP; industry

摘要

When a firm's chief executive officer is also the chairperson of its board, directors have opposing objectives. According to organization theory, such CEO duality establishes strong, unambiguous leadership. But according to agency theory, duality promotes CEO entrenchment by reducing board monitoring effectiveness. We developed a contingency framework to resolve these perspectives. Sampling three industries to enhance generalizability, we found that board vigilance was positively associated with CEO duality. Duality was less common, however, when CEOs had high informal power and when firm performance was high.