ROLE OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS IN TAKEOVER RESISTANCE - EFFECTS OF CEO INCENTIVES AND INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: BUCHHOLTZ, AK; RIBBENS, BA
• 署名单位: Minnesota State Colleges & Universities; Saint Cloud State University
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/256700
• 发表日期: 1994
• 页码: 554-579
• 关键词: top management turnover; golden parachutes; corporate-control; Ownership structure; Agency theory; tender offer; DECISION-MODELS; BOARD; acquisitions; DIRECTORS

摘要

This study examined the influence of chief executive officers' (CEO) incentives and individual characteristics on the likelihood that target firms will resist takeover attempts. Results showed that the greater the level of CEO stock ownership, the lower the likelihood of takeover resistance; however, neither the existence nor the magnitude of a CEO's ''golden parachute'' payment affected takeover resistance. Although CEO age had a curvilinear relationship with the likelihood of takeover resistance, CEO tenure was insignificant.