CEO COMPENSATION MONITORING AND FIRM PERFORMANCE

• 成果类型: Note
• 署名作者: TOSI, HL; GOMEZMEJIA, LR
• 署名单位: Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/256609
• 发表日期: 1994
• 页码: 1002-1016
• 关键词: STRATEGIC CONTROL; corporate-control; Agency theory; incentives; pay

摘要

This study used a behavioral scale assessing the monitoring of the compensation of chief executive officers (CEOs) to test two hypotheses derived from agency theory and the corporate governance literature. Results were consistent with the hypotheses, showing that CEO compensation monitoring is related asymptotically to firm performance and that the relationship between monitoring and performance is stronger in management-controlled firms than in owner-controlled firms.