Other people's money: The effects of ownership on compensation strategy and managerial pay

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Werner, S; Tosi, HL
• 署名单位: State University System of Florida; University of Florida
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/256849
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 1672-1691
• 关键词: corporate-control; executive-compensation; firm performance; MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION; Agency theory; incentives; size

摘要

This study analyzes the compensation strategy of firms. We examined differences in the pay and incentives of lower-level managers in firms with different levels of management discretion. We found that firms with higher managerial discretion paid compensation premiums through higher salaries, greater bonuses, and more long-term incentives; however, changes in pay were not related to changes in performance, and high-discretion firms did not perform better than other types of firms.