Agency theory and variable pay compensation strategies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Stroh, LK; Brett, JM; Baumann, JP; Reilly, AH
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; Loyola University Chicago
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/256663
• 发表日期: 1996
• 页码: 751-767
• 关键词: Incentives; determinants; performance; turbulence; MARKETS

摘要

This study used a sample of middle-level managers to investigate the effects of organization-level agency-theory-based variables on the proportion of variable compensation that managers receive. Level of task programmability was associated with an increased use of variable pay, and long-term relationships between an agent and principal were associated with decreased use. Results supported the classical organization-theory prediction that under higher risk, organizations use higher proportions of variable pay; but results question agency theory's ability to predict compensation strategy for middle-level managers in the high-risk situation.