A longitudinal disaggregation of operational risk under changing regulations: Evidence from the savings and loan industry

• 成果类型: Review
• 署名作者: Wiseman, RM; Catanach, AH
• 署名单位: University of Virginia
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/256949
• 发表日期: 1997
• 页码: 799-830
• 关键词: RETURN RELATIONSHIPS; prospect-theory; Ownership structure; decision-making; Agency problems; PARADOX LOST; market share; BEHAVIOR; strategy; deregulation

摘要

The reported research examines the relative contributions of prospect and agency theory explanations for specific operational risks and subsequent firm performance in regulated and unregulated environments. Specifically, this study simultaneously models competing theoretical explanations for risk using three distinct realized operational risks managed by savings and loan (S&L) firms. It then examines the effects of these risks on performance. Implications of this study argue for a mesotheoretic approach to the modeling of risk and for its disaggregation into distinct risk choices.