Interest alignment and coalitions in multiparty negotiation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Polzer, JT; Mannix, EA; Neale, MA
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Columbia University; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/256896
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 42-54
• 关键词: distributive justice; PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS; FUTURE INTERACTION; BEHAVIOR; ORGANIZATIONS; NORMS; EQUALITY; benefits; models; equity

摘要

This study tested hypotheses developed from the distinct literatures on negotiations and coalitions and hypotheses integrating the two, In a complex, three-person negotiation simulation, subjects had to decide jointly how to allocate two resource pools, They were gir en multiple pieces of information regarding their negotiation preferences, coalition alternatives, and entitlements. Coalition alternatives and entitlement cuss affected only the resource pool to which they were directly linked, bug. compatible interests, through the coalitions they generated, affected both resource pools, including the one to which these interests were not directly linked. The discuss the importance of integrating negotiation and coalition research in a wagr that Incorporates the social dynamics of the negotiation interaction.