Misrepresentation and expectations of misrepresentation in an ethical dilemma: The role of incentives and temptation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tenbrunsel, AE
• 署名单位: University of Notre Dame
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/256911
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 330-339
• 关键词: UNETHICAL DECISION BEHAVIOR; individual-differences; ORGANIZATIONS; deception; MODEL

摘要

An investigation of ethical decision making in a negotiation context revealed that focal actors' incentives influenced not only their misrepresentation, but also their expectations of their opponents' misrepresentation, suggesting that individuals hold motivated expectations about their opponents. The notion that individuals engage in defensive ethics received only modest support. The incentives of opponents influenced expectations about their misrepresentation but did not impact the focal actors' misrepresentation; however, correlational data revealed a significant relationship between the opponents' temptation and the focal actors' misrepresentation that was mediated by expectations of the opponents' misrepresentation. Furthermore, temptation mediated the proposed relationships, suggesting that it may serve as an individual factor filtering the situational influence of incentives.