The role of family ties in agency contracts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gomez-Mejia, LR; Nuñez-Nickel, M; Gutierrez, I
• 署名单位: Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/3069338
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 81-95
• 关键词: research-and-development; organizational-change; succession; OWNERSHIP; performance; incentives; trust; COSTS; firm; term

摘要

Drawing on data based on the entire population of Spanish newspapers over 27 years (1966-93), this study shows that firm performance and business risk are much stronger predictors of chief executive tenure when a firm's owners and its executive have family ties and that the organizational consequences of CEO dismissal are more favorable when the replaced CEO is a member of the family owning the firm. The study also demonstrates that executives operating under weakly relational (less ambiguous) contracts are held more accountable for firm performance and business risk outcomes, even under nonfamily contracting.