So close and yet so far: Promotion versus exit for CEO heirs apparent

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cannella, AA Jr; Shen, W
• 署名单位: Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/3069454
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 252-270
• 关键词: ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE; EXECUTIVE SUCCESSION; POWER; management; governance; coalition; DIRECTORS; boards; ANTECEDENT; OWNERSHIP

摘要

Heirs apparent are frequently a central component of CEO successions but have been largely ignored in the succession literature. Our study examines heir apparent tenures and two contrasting outcomes-promotion to CEO and firm exit. We propose that the distribution of power among an incumbent CEO, outside directors, and an heir apparent influences these outcomes. Results suggest that outside director and CEO power are important influences on heir promotion and exit and that heirs who arise from within a firm are less likely to exit.