Managerialist and human capital explanations for key executive pay premiums: A contingency perspective

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Combs, JG; Skill, MS
• 署名单位: State University System of Florida; Florida State University; University System of Ohio; University of Dayton
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/30040676
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 63-73
• 关键词: Agency theory; CEO DUALITY; COMPENSATION; performance; determinants; entrenchment; succession; RESOURCES; Plurality; deaths

摘要

Managerialism is a theory that suggests that managers extract pay premiums by gaining control over their firms' compensation processes. Human capital theory suggests instead that pay premiums reflect executives' superior managerial abilities. This study tests a contingency perspective in which the source of pay premiums depends on executives' power and firms' governance strength. Results suggest pay premiums are a consequence of human capital in some firms and managerial entrenchment in others. Several implications are offered to guide future inquiry.