Bidding wars over R&D-intensive firms: Knowledge, opportunism, and the market for corporate control

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Coff, R
• 署名单位: Emory University
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/30040677
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 74-85
• 关键词: management; uncertainty; DIRECTORS; Lockups; boards

摘要

The knowledge-based theory of the firm suggests that, as knowledge intensity increases, knowledge management concerns, not opportunism, should increasingly drive organizational boundary decisions. Therefore, as R&D intensity increases, knowledge-based theory should gain explanatory power over transaction cost economics, in which opportunism is the primary driver. However, this study shows problems of opportunism increasing with R&D intensity. For example, as R&D intensity increased, managers actively discouraged bidding wars. Transaction cost economics seems to gain explanatory power as knowledge intensity grows.