Giving money to get money: How CEO stock options and CEO equity enhance IPO valuations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Certo, ST; Daily, CM; Cannella, AA Jr; Dalton, DR
• 署名单位: Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/30040655
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 643-653
• 关键词: executive-compensation; Risk reduction; OWNERSHIP; performance; management; firm; DECISION; determinants; reputation; strategy

摘要

Recent research has suggested that stock options and equity ownership have different motivational implications for executive risk taking. We examined investors' reactions to the differing incentive properties of stock options and equity ownership in the context of firms undertaking initial public offerings (IPOs). We found that stock options and equity ownership interacted to influence the premiums that investors applied to IPO firms. We suggest that the effectiveness of CEO stock options may depend on the level of CEO equity.